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This article argues the case for addressing misogynistic, as well as transphobic,
crime, through legislation. We assert that gender as a protected category is
presumptively inclusive of bias against trans and non-binary identities.
Introduction
The question as to whether gender should be included in hate crime legislation as
a protected characteristic is one which is under consideration across the UK. It is
currently being addressed in three separate law reform projects, in Scotland, in
England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. It is noteworthy that across all three
jurisdictions, transgender people have either been protected in legislation or
included in police recording practices for a number of years. In Scotland, and in
England and Wales, legislation names transgender identity as a protected ground.
In Northern Ireland, hate crime legislation omits transgender people from the range
of projected categories but police record “transphobic incidents”. A considerable
amount of literature has been generated seeking to find a normative basis for the
determination of the range of protected groups in hate crime legislation, and this
article does not propose to rehearse these arguments, except to say that there is no
agreement amongst scholars on the issue.1
1See, for example, F.M. Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under American Law (Harvard University Press,
1999); M. Blake, “Geeks and Monsters: bias crimes and social identity” (2001) 20(2) Law and Philosophy 121; R.
Grattet and V. Jenness, “Examining the Boundaries of Hate Crime Law: Disabilities and the ‘Dilemma of Difference’”
in B. Perry (ed.), Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge, 2003); N. Chakraborti, “Crimes Against the ‘Other’:
Conceptual, Operational, and Empirical Challenges for Hate Studies” (2010) 8 Journal of Hate Studies 9; J. Garland,
“Difficulties in defining hate crime victimization” (2011) 18(1) International Review of Victimology 25; N. Chakraborti
and J. Garland, “ReconceptualisingHate Crime through the Lens of Vulnerability andDifference” (2012) 16 Theoretical
Criminology 499; G. Mason, “Victim Attributes in Hate Crime Law” (2014) 54 British Journal of Criminology 161;
G.Mason, “The symbolic purpose of hate crime law: Ideal victims and emotion” (2014) 18(1) Theoretical Criminology
75; M. Walters, S. Wiedlitzka and A. Owusu-Bempah with K. Goodall, Hate Crime and the Legal Process: Options
for Law Reform (University of Sussex, 2017); C. Bakalis, “The victims of hate crime and the principles of the criminal
law” [2017] Legal Studies; M. Al-Hakim, “Making a Home for the Homeless in Hate Crime Legislation” (2015)
30(10) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1755; J. Schweppe, “Defining Characteristics and Politicising Victims: A
Legal Perspective” (2012) 10 Journal of Hate Studies 173.
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This article examines the question as to whether gender should be a protected
category in hate crime legislation by seeking to understand what gender is, by
elaborating its relationship to misogyny, and by placing it in the context of how
legislation in both Scotland and England and Wales addresses transphobic hate
crime. We argue that the construct of gender is inclusive of the full range of cis2
and trans3 gender identities, and the range of manifestations of transphobia and
misogyny emanating from the system of power relations which gender signifies.
However, we also argue that the current degree of imprecision in the interpretation
and operationalisation of the terms gender, gender identity, and indeed sex, in case
law and crime statistics, necessitates that we develop a legislative approach which
is explicitly inclusive of the three terms.
In formulating our conclusions, we draw, in particular, on crime and victimisation
data from Canada, as well as data from the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
We also analyse existing policing and legislative models in common law
jurisdictions, in which gender has been included for a number of years, as well as
an English pilot project which sought to address misogynistic hate crime in
particular.
Defining sex and gender
Although legislators, policy makers and researchers have sometimes used the terms
gender and sex interchangeably, we understand the terms to be related, but distinct.4
Sex is the label commonly used to refer to a biologically-based identity—male or
female—which is assigned to an individual, usually at birth, based on the
appearance and binary classification of their genitals and sometimes, where these
are known, their chromosomal make-up. On the other hand, we understand gender
as a concept which encapsulates the range of expectations, assumptions, constraints
and privileges, which society confers on us based onwhether we have been assigned
male or female.5 Gender, far from being natural or neutral, “is a cultural and
historical product, as opposed to essentialist definitions of the physical differences
between the sexes”6 and “… a system of power and not just a set of stereotypes or
observable differences between women and men”.7 Gender identity, then, is a
person’s felt relationship to gender. Those whose gender identity does not align
in a socially accepted way with their assigned sex can experience hostility,
discrimination and violence.
2 “Cis is the Latin prefix for ‘on the same side.’ It compliments trans, the prefix for ‘across’ or ‘over.’ ‘Cisgender’
replaces the terms ‘nontransgender’ or ‘bio man/bio woman’ to refer to individuals who have a match between the
gender they were assigned at birth, their bodies, and their personal identity.” K. Schilt and L. Westbrook, “Doing
Gender, Doing Heteronormativity: ‘Gender Normals,’ Transgender People, and the Social Maintenance of
Heterosexuality” [2009] Gender and Society 461.
3Throughout this article we use the term trans inclusively, to refer not only to men and women with a trans identity
or history, but also to non-binary identities.
4 J. Lorber, Paradoxes of gender (Yale University Press, 1994).
5R. Hubbard, “Gender and genitals: Constructs of sex and gender” [1996] Social Text 157.
6R. Braidotti. “The Uses and Abuses of the Sex/Gender Distinction in European Feminist Practices”, in G. Griffin
and R. Braidotti (eds), Thinking Differently: A Reader in European Women's Studies (Zed Books, 2002), p.287.
7H. Brod and M. Kaufman, Theorizing Masculinities (Sage, 1994), p.4.
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“Gender identities develop within gendered societies, where the pressure to
adopt the ‘correct’ and ‘corresponding’ gender according to presenting sex
is strong.”8
Non-conformity, therefore, represents a challenge to the gender order.
We acknowledge the complex relationship between gender and sex, and that
binary sex categories are also socially constructed.9 Neither bodies nor identities
can be accurately parsed into binary categories restricted to male and female,
masculine and feminine. In both senses, people present on continuums which
includes biologically intersex people,10 and people who identify as non-binary,
genderfluid, and agender.11 Indeed, we have previously argued that misogyny and
transphobia have common roots as expressions of hostility towards a person on
the basis of their relationship to gender. Both represent hostility towards
non-conformity to culturally embedded expectations regarding appropriate ways
of being a man or a woman, and towards perceived challenges to the gender order,
that is, institutionalised relations of power and privilege organised around gender.12
The parallels between misogynistic crime and transphobic crime are
clear—intimidation and violence enacted against the victim (a) manifests
ideologically-justified unequal gendered power relations, and (b) punishes and
seeks to prevent transgression of the existing gender order, from which (c) the
offender also draws legitimation for their acts. Both misogynistic and transphobic
hate crimes serve to police and defend the existing gender order.13
Thus, when we discuss including “gender” as a protected ground in hate crime
legislation, we are not only concerned with the inclusion of cisgender women and
men, but also transgender and non-binary people, as well as the range of
justifications on which offenders draw for targeting people of any gender identity
who do not conform to hegemonic gender relations. Importantly, this approach
may exclude intersex people14 where they are targeted specifically on the basis of
biological difference, rather than perceived non-conformity to a binary gender
order, and thus it is also worth observing that either sex or sex characteristics are
terms which can accurately be used to be inclusive of such experiences.
Law reform processes in the UK
Both Scotland and England andWales are currently considering whether sex and/or
gender should be included in hate crime legislation, and this question is also
8 J.L. Johnson and R. Repta, “Sex and gender” in J.L. Oliffe and L. Greaves (eds), Designing and conducting
gender, sex, and health research (Sage, 2012), p.24.
9C. Delphy, “Rethinking sex and gender” (1993) 16(1) Women’s Studies International Forum
10F. Romana Ammaturo, “Intersexuality and the ‘Right to Bodily Integrity’ Critical Reflections on Female Genital
Cutting, Circumcision, and Intersex ‘Normalizing Surgeries’ in Europe” (2016) 25(5) Social and Legal Studies 591.
11M. Paz Galupo, L. Pulice-Farrow and J.L. Ramirez. “‘Like a constantly flowing river’: Gender identity flexibility
among nonbinary transgender individuals” in J. Sinnott (ed.), Identity flexibility during adulthood (Springer, 2017).
12A. Haynes and J. Schweppe, “Should misogyny be a protected characteristic in hate crime legislation?” in R.
Sternberg (ed.), Hate in the Modern World (American Psychological Association, 2019) (forthcoming). See also
Johnson and Repta. “Sex and gender” in Oliffe and Greaves, Designing and conducting gender, sex, and health
research (Sage, 2012).
13K. Manne, Down girl: The logic of misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); J. Schweppe and A.
Haynes, Gendered policing and policing gender: The Trans Community and An Garda Síochána (TENI, 2018).
14 “‘Intersex’ is … an umbrella term to denote a number of different variations in a person’s bodily characteristics
that do not match strict medical definitions of male or female. These characteristics may be chromosomal, hormonal
and/or anatomical and may be present to differing degrees.” EU Fundamental Rights Agency, “The Fundamental
Rights Situation of Intersex People” (2015) 4 EUFRA.
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expected to form the basis of discussions in the recently announced Northern
Ireland review. The Law Commission of England and Wales will address this
question in the coming months, and the terms of reference particularly include a
question as to whether:
“… crimes motivated by, or demonstrating, hatred based on sex and gender
characteristics, or hatred of older people or other potential protected
characteristics should be hate crimes, with reference to underlying principle
and the practical implications of changing the law.”15
In Scotland, Lord Bracadale conducted an independent review into the need for
reform of hate crime legislation in Scotland, which was preceded by a comparative
report by Chalmers and Leverick.16 This process specifically asked whether gender
hostility should be included as a protected ground in legislation. In Chalmers and
Leverick’s report, they observe that sex is a protected characteristic in Canada,
the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Vermont and West Virginia. Gender is
protected in Louisiana and Maryland, and in the draft South African Bill, both are
mentioned.17They suggested that it is relatively easy tomake a case for the inclusion
of sex (their term)18 in hate crime legislation: “it could be done, for example, on
the basis that women [and the elderly] are groups who experience (unjustified)
marginalisation in society”.19
In his Report to the Scottish Parliament, Lord Bracadale stated at the outset that
he used the term “gender” rather than “sex” because it was the term used by most
organisations and consultation respondents. In considering whether gender should
be included in legislation, he stated clearly:
“I am persuaded that there are patterns of offending which relate particularly
to the victim’s gender and which should be addressed through legislation
which might be seen as falling under the hate crime umbrella.”20
Lord Bracadale was of the view that there was evidence that certain crimes
(namely, online and offline abuse, assault, and harassment) are committed against
women for a reason “related to their gender” and which could be dealt with by the
law more effectively than currently. He was of the view that categorising such
behaviour as hate crime would achieve the following results:
“1) It would make it more culturally acceptable to object to the
behaviour—victimswould havemore confidence that it will be taken
seriously by the criminal justice system (whether the police,
prosecutors or the courts).
15LawCommission, LawCommission review into hate crime announced (LawCommission of England andWales,
2018), available at https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/law-commission-review-into-hate-crime-announced/ [Accessed 21
November 2019].
16 J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to the Hate Crime
Legislation Review (University of Glasgow, 2017).
17Chalmers and Leverick, A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to the Hate Crime
Legislation Review (2017).
18As well as age
19Chalmers and Leverick, A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to the Hate Crime
Legislation Review (2017), p.6.
20A.P. Campbell, Independent Review of Hate Crime Legislation in Scotland: Final Report (Scottish Government,
2018).
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2) It would recognise the additional harm caused to the individuals
involved and others who identify with them.
3) It would have a symbolic value—giving security to community and
“send a message”.
4) It would allow for record keeping, the collection of data, and a
targeted response to offenders.”21
As such, recent policy debates as to whether sex or gender should be included
in legislation have been framed specifically in terms of whether cisgender identities,
specifically cisgender women, should be included among the range of protected
grounds. The question has been approached as one which addresses the means by
which misogynistic hate crime might be recognised and sanctioned.
Prior to providing our assessment as to how cisgender and transgender identities
can be best included in legislation, we first address two current models whereby
cisgender identities have been considered in criminal justice processes: one which
specifically names gender as a protected ground in legislation, and the other which
records gender-related hate crime through policing.
Addressing misogynistic hate crime in practice: a legislative
model
Introduced in 1995, s.718.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that when
sentencing, a court should consider a number of factors, and aggravate or mitigate
the sentence accordingly.22 The first of these factors, provided for in s.718.2(a)(i),
is relevant here: until 2017, it provided that
“evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on
race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or
physical disability, sexual orientation, or any other similar factor”
should be taken into account in sentencing.23 In 2017, the section was amended to
include “gender identity or expression”. In Gray24 the Court of Appeal of Alberta
stated that s.718.2(a)(i) was a reflection of Canadian values:
“The courts must be vigilant to preserve and sustain the freedoms enshrined
in theCharterwhich reflect the moral compass of our Nation. Bias, prejudice
or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin is anathema to the values that
we cherish, cannot be tolerated and must be condemned.”25
There is very little information available regarding how s.718.2(a)(i) is operating
in practice, and Corb observes that this is particularly the case in the context of
“judicial practice and legal process’ relating to hate crime in Canada.26 Lawrence
21Campbell, Independent Review of Hate Crime Legislation in Scotland: Final Report (2018), p.39.
22The criminalisation of hate speech is provided for in ss.318, 319 and 430 of the Canadian Criminal Code (the
advocation of genocide, public incitement of hatred, and attacks on religious property and institutions respectively),
and are considered by A. Corb, “Hate and hate crime in Canada” in N. Hall et al (eds), The Routledge international
handbook on hate crime (Routledge, 2015).
23Corb, “Hate and hate crime in Canada” in Hall et al (eds), The Routledge international handbook on hate crime
(2015), pp.278–288.
24Gray [2013] ABCA 237.
25Gray [2013] ABCA 237 at [18].
26Corb, “Hate and hate crime in Canada” in Hall et al (eds), The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime
(2015).
152 Criminal Law Review
[2020] Crim. L.R., Issue 2 © 2020 Thomson Reuters
et al observe that one of the reasons for this is that s.718.2(a)(i) is a “rarely used
provision”.27
In terms of self-reported data on the prevalence of hate crime, the General Social
Survey of Canada addresses the topic of victimisation every five years.28 In 2014,
victims reported that the incident they experienced was motivated by hate in 5 per
cent of all cases (or 330,913 incidents) reported to the GSS. Race was the most
commonly cited motivation for incidents perceived to be motivated by hate,
identified by 51 per cent of victims. Sex was identified as a motivation by 26 per
cent of victims, with smaller proportions identifying age (19 per cent), and religion
(11 per cent)29.
Data published by Statistics Canada on police-reported hate crime also
disaggregate by category of motivation. Data for police reported hate crime for
the years 2014–2017 are as follows30:
2017201620152014Type of motivation
878666641611Race or ethnicity
842460469429Religion
204176141155Sexual orientation
23131812Language
1011810Disability
32241222Sex
4546Age
48354427Other similar factor
32192523Unknown motivation
2,0731,4091,3521,295Total
While the figures for crimes committed against an individual on the basis of
their “sex” are relatively low in 2014–2017, Lawrence et al note that in 2009, there
were only five police-recorded cases of hate crime on the basis of “sex”, which
amounted to “far less than 1% of police-reported hate crimes”.31 It is worth noting
that police-recorded data on hate crimes motivated by sex in Canada include
transphobic crimes.32 In terms of numbers, Armstrong states that from 2010 to
2013,
“31 hate crimes targeting transgender or asexual people were reported
by police participating in the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey
(version 2.1). Of these crimes, nearly half (15 incidents) occurred
in 2017 alone.”33
27A. Lawrence with J. Shugarman and D. Grech, Hate as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing in Canada
(Department of Justice, 2009), p.17.
28 Statistics Canada, General Social Survey – Victimization, available at http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV
.pl?Function=getSurvey&Id=49195 [Accessed 21 November 2019].
29A. Armstrong, Police-reported hate crime in Canada (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2019), p.7.
30Available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510006601 [Accessed 21 November 2019].
31Lawrence with Shugarman and Grech, Hate as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing in Canada (2009), p.24.
32Armstrong, Police-reported hate crime in Canada (2019), p.13.
33Armstrong, Police-reported hate crime in Canada (2019), p.14.
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There are a limited number of reported cases in which the prosecution sought
to aggravate the sentence on the basis that the offence was motivated by bias,
prejudice or hate based on the sex of the victim. In Lebevfre,34 the defendant was
convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, uttering death threats, and assault.
The defendant and his co-accused kicked and punched a woman described by the
court as a prostitute, whom the two men had engaged for services. Following the
assault, the co-accused urinated on the victim andmade death threats. The sentence
was aggravated due to the particularly cruel nature of the offences, and the fact
that the crime appeared to be motivated by hatred of women was an aggravating
factor in the case.35
In Stevovic36 the offender was convicted of uttering a threat to cause death or
bodily harm. He approached a woman, and propositioned her by stating that he
had some flavoured condoms, and asking if she wanted to try one, and then saying
“Nice tits, I’d like to fuck you.”37 The victim did not respond and told the offender
she was going to call the police. When she stated she had the police on the phone,
he replied, “You’d better not be calling the police, or you’re dead”, and then said
to her “I’m going to kill you after I rape you”.38 The sentencing court stated that
during the trial, the offender made “disturbing comments in relation to the victim”.39
In considering whether the crime was motivated by a “bias, prejudice or hate based
on sex” the judge was of the view that it was for three key reasons: first, the lack
of acceptance of responsibility; second, his continued verbal aggression in relation
to the victim in court; and third, there was no reason or motivation to explain his
conduct other than his very negative views of females.40
In Jean41 the offender had picked up the victim, who was described by the court
as a prostitute, and drove her to a remote area. The victim asked the offender to
drive back to the city, which he refused, and as he drove, he began to forcibly
remove the victim’s clothing, calling her a “dirty whore”, telling her that he hated
such people, andmaking threats to kill her.42While driving, he forced her to perform
oral sex on him, and also digitally penetrated her anus and vagina.When he stopped
the vehicle, he demanded the victim remove all her clothes and get out of the car,
after which he also exited the vehicle. She thought he was going to kill her, and
tried to escape in the car, an escape which he foiled by breaking the window and
pulling the victim out of the window by her neck and hair. She then escaped. In
sentencing the offender, counsel for the prosecution argued that the sentence should
be aggravated because it was “motivated by bias or prejudice, or hatred of,
women”.43 The court responded:
“I am unable to find or infer such motivation here beyond a reasonable doubt
or even on a balance of probabilities. Despite the fact that his three victims
have been women. Perhaps his offences were driven by the wish to dominate
34 Lebevfre [1998] JQ no.985.
35The original decision is in the French language, and here we rely on a summary of the case provided by the
Dominion Report Service Lefebvre DRS 98-19316.
36 Stevovic [2007] BCPC 0264.
37 Stevovic [2007] BCPC 0264 at [5].
38 Stevovic [2007] BCPC 0264 at [7].
39 Stevovic [2007] BCPC 0264 at [11].
40 Stevovic [2007] BCPC 0264 at [33]–[35].
41 Jean [2008] BCCA 465.
42 Jean [2008] BCCA 465 at [5].
43 Jean [2007] Carswell BC 3525.
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his victims, but that does not seem to be contemplated by the hate crime
legislation relied on by Crown Counsel, and specifically s. 718.2(a)(i) of the
Criminal Code.”44
While the case was appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, this issue
was not addressed by that court.
Similarly, in Smith45 the defendant was convicted of making, possessing, and
distributing obscene material. The material in question was described by the court
as follows:
“The content of the written and visual materials focuses on simulations of
sexualized violence against women. The purpose, as set out by Donald Smith
on one of the sites, is ‘to show beautiful women getting killed.’ Mr. Smith
uses film and special effects enhanced by computer editing to make the visual
materials. In them, women in a state of nudity or semi-nudity, are shot,
stabbed, stalked, executed by bow and arrow, or shown in combat with swords
and knives. In order to make these materials, he recruited models through
newspaper advertisements in Winnipeg.
The impugned films fuse sex and violence. In them, the male assailant is
portrayed as being competent and a successful individual who can silence
women with his violence, leave them on sexual display, and walk away
without consequence. The women in these films are easily manipulated, and
in some instances, shown as being complicit in the violence. Because they
are portrayed as ‘bad women’ by being sexually loose; or attempting to use
their sexuality to control men, violence against them is portrayed as being
justified.”46
The prosecution argued in the case that s.718.2 should apply, as the offences
were, they argued, “motivated by bias, prejudice or hate towards women”.47 The
sentencing court simply stated that it “was not satisfied there is evidence on this
point”.48 Again, this case was appealed by the defendant—both to the Ontario
Court of Appeal49 and the Supreme Court of Canada50—but the question of the
application of s.718.2 was not addressed in either court.51
While the Canadian legislation is to be commended for including a broad range
of protected characteristics, a number of lessons can be learned from the Canadian
experience. First, in the context of the case law, it could be suggested that there is
no consistency in the manner in which the “sex” ground is understood in the context
of the aggravated provisions. While that may be true, this criticism is not particular
to this category of offences and should be seen in the context of the small volume
of reported cases on the application of the provisions generally across all categories.
What both these issues speak to, we believe, is the importance of shared policies
44Jean [2007] Carswell BC 3525 at [20]–[21]. Jean had previously pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault,
two counts of unlawful confinement, one count of rape, and one count of gross indecency. Jean [2007] Carswell BC
3525 at [6].
45 Smith [2002] OJ No.5018.
46 Smith [2002] OJ No.5018 at [4]–[7].
47 Smith [2002] OJ No.5018 at [24].
48 Smith [2002] OJ No.5018 at [24].
49 Smith [2012] OJ 5968.
50 Smith [2013] SCCA No.70.
51The case of Lefebvre [1998] JQ No.985.
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and training on the issue of hate crime across the criminal process, an issue we
have highlighted in detail elsewhere.52 Equally as concerning is what can be
considered relatively high rates of gender-related hate crime self-reported by the
population through the General Social Survey, but relatively low rates of police
reporting. Again, this is perhaps best considered in the context of low reporting
rates across all characteristics.53
The conflation of cisgender and transgender identities under the category of sex
in police-recorded data, is also worth highlighting as conceptually commendable.
However, for the purposes of designing interventions to address the needs of
victims, from police training to the signposting of civil society supports, it is
important to be able to disaggregate betweenmisogynistic and transphobic crimes.54
This is most appropriately done at the point of police recording.
These issues are all worthy of consideration in the context of the UK law reform
projects, particularly in a context where reporting rates for hate crime are relatively
high. We will now go on to consider examples of how misogynistic crime is
addressed through policing: one from England, and one from Ireland.
Policing misogynistic hate crime
Nottinghamshire, England
While legislation in England and Wales is relatively limited in terms of the scope
of protected classes, various police forces have expanded their working definitions
of hate crime to allow for recording of hate crime and incidents across a broader
range of characteristics. Often in response to a local event, hate crime and incidents
such as these will be tracked by officers and treated as hate crime to the point of
prosecution.
For example, following a spate of attacks which left six sex workers/prostitutes
dead between 2000 and 2005, police in Liverpool implemented what is now known
as the “Merseyside model”.55 In 2006, Merseyside Police announced that all crimes
against sex workers/prostitutes were to be treated as hate crimes. Ellison and Smith
state that the decision, accompanied by the setting up of a special unit between
the Merseyside Police and the Crown Prosecution Service, had “staggering”
results.56 Ellison and Smith observe that, because of the financial and human
resources dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of hate offences, “in 2010,
the Merseyside Police had an 84 per cent conviction rate for those who committed
violent acts towards sex workers and a 67 per cent conviction for rape”.57 In April
2013, the Greater Manchester Police announced that it would be recording attacks
52 J. Schweppe, A. Haynes and M.A. Walters, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Comparative Report (ICCL, 2018).
53Reporting rates in Canada compare very unfavourably to those in England and Wales, for example.
54A. Haynes and J. Schweppe, “LGB and T?” in A. Haynes, J. Schweppe, Jennifer and S. Taylor, Critical
Perspectives on Hate Crime (Palgrave, 2017).
55G. Ellison and L. Smith, “Hate Crime Legislation and Violence Against Sex Workers: Lessons in Policy and
Practice” in A. Haynes, J. Schweppe and S. Taylor (eds), Critical Perspectives on Hate Crime: Contributions from
the Island of Ireland (2017).
56Ellison and Smith, “Hate Crime Legislation and Violence Against SexWorkers: Lessons in Policy and Practice”
in Haynes, Schweppe and Taylor (eds),Critical Perspectives on Hate Crime: Contributions from the Island of Ireland
(2017), p.197.
57Ellison and Smith, “Hate Crime Legislation and Violence Against SexWorkers: Lessons in Policy and Practice”
in Haynes, Schweppe and Taylor (eds),Critical Perspectives on Hate Crime: Contributions from the Island of Ireland
(2017), pp.197–198.
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on members of “alternative subcultures” as hate crimes, following discussions
with the Sophie Lancaster Foundation.58
Similarly, the Nottinghamshire Police started recording misogynistic hate crime
in April 2016. The police service records misogyny as a hate crime, with its
definition of “misogyny hate crime” being “incidents against women that are
motivated by an attitude of a man towards a woman and includes behaviour targeted
towards a woman by men simply because they are a woman”.59
There are no data published on the manner in which the definition has been
operationalised, but a number of Freedom of Information requests have been
submitted, and some of these responses have been made publicly available. From
April to December 2016, there were 79 reports of misogynistic hate crimes and
incidents made to Nottinghamshire police,60 31 of which were categorised as hate
crime.61 These offences included harassment, kidnapping, possession of weapons
and causing fear, alarm or distress. 62 In their evaluation, Mullany and Trickett
observe that fromApril 2016 toMarch 2018, 174women reported such experiences,
of which 73 were classified as hate crimes.63 They do not give figures for the
number of arrests, or the number of cases in which charges were brought, but note
that there was one conviction (though the crime for which the individual was
prosecuted is not stated).64
It is useful to highlight the findings of theMullany and Trickett report in relation
to police perspectives on the issue.65 It should be said at the outset that the
perceptions and experiences of the police in this context must be read in the context
of their training on misogynistic hate crime, which was described by the authors
as having served to “alienate the police and undermined the purpose of the training,
making it less effective”.66 They found that the majority of the police officers who
participated in focus groups as part of the research were dismissive of the policy,
and were not in favour of its introduction. The authors state that there were three
main reasons given by the police officers for this:
• The policy was not required, as the underlying offence could already
be addressed using existing laws, and the police officers asserted
that they were already dealing with these types of behaviours;
• Police officers queried the categorisation of the behaviours as hate
crime because, first, they argued that the behaviours did not always
58 J. Garland and P. Hodkinson, “‘F**king Freak! What the Hell Do You Think You Look Like?’: Experiences of
Targeted Victimization Among Goths and Developing Notions of Hate Crime” (2014) 54(4) British Journal of
Criminology 613.
59See, BBC News, “Nottinghamshire Police records misogyny as a hate crime” (13 July 2016)http://www.bbc.com
/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-36775398 [Accessed 21 November 2019]. For a discussion of this development
see H. Mason-Bish, “‘Get yer tits out’: Why Misogynistic Street Harrassment is a Hate Crime” (INHS, 2016), http:
//www.internationalhatestudies.com/get-yer-tits-out-why-misogynistic-street-harassment-is-a-hate-crime/ [Accessed
21 November 2019]. See also an evaluation of this innovation, L. Mullany and L. Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime
Evaluation Report (University of Nottingham and Nottingham Trent University, 2018).
60Nottinghamshire Police, “Request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000”, available at https://www
.nottinghamshire.police.uk/sites/default/files/documents/files/009280%20-%2016.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2019].
61Nottinghamshire Police, “Request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000”, available at https://www
.nottinghamshire.police.uk/sites/default/files/documents/files/009280%20-%2016.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2019].
62 J. Mackenzie, “Misogyny hate crime statistics revealed”, BBC News (19 September 2016), http://www.bbc.com
/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-37405732 [Accessed 21 November 2019].
63Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.3.
64Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.3.
65Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.3.
66Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.52.
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involve “hate” per se (demonstrating a narrow interpretation of the
concept of hate crime); and second, they perceived that misogynistic
behaviour, unlike homophobic, anti-religious, or racist crime, “was
not really to do with hatred …”.67
• The policy resulted in “net-widening”, as “a lot of the activities that
were not crimes were being included”,68 which resulted in officers
seeing the policy as “another example of over-recording”, and
“simply a ‘paper exercise’ that required another ‘box’ to be ticked.”69
That said, Mullany and Trickett suggest that these views are out of keeping with
the general population, who gave a clear public mandate supporting the policy.
Indeed, their research is particularly interesting in the context of these findings.
Those individuals from the general public who participated in the study were
generally unaware of what the policy covered, and how to report a crime if it
happened to them. However, once the policy was explained to focus groups and
interview participants (including both men and women), they were very positive
about it, and thought it should be rolled out nationally.
Ireland
In an Irish context, aside from the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989,
there is no legislation in Ireland which addresses hate in any other context. As
there is no hate crime legislation in an Irish context, misogynistic hate crime is
addressed in the same manner as other manifestations of hate crime. Generally,
Haynes et al, and Haynes and Schweppe, have detailed the manner in which hate
crime is addressed in Ireland in the absence of legislation, highlighting the fact
that it is poorly understood and addressed across the criminal justice process.70 So
routine is this fact that they refer to it as the “disappearing” of hate crime through
the criminal justice process.71
However, despite these legislative shortcomings, in 2002 An Garda Síochána
began to record what they refer to as crimes with a “discriminatory motive”,
recording such crimes under the categories of homophobia, antisemitism,
sectarianism, racism and xenophobia. However, given the low levels of recording
of hate crime, the Garda Inspectorate 2014 Crime Investigation Report
recommended that An Garda Síochána ensure that all crimes containing elements
of hate or discrimination were flagged on the police recording system, PULSE
(Policing Using Leading Systems Effectively) and that An Garda Síochána create
clear modus operandi features on PULSE that allow the accurate recording of the
nine strands of the Diversity Strategy, namely: age, disability, family status, gender,
sexual orientation, marital status, race, religious belief and membership of the
Traveller Community.72 In November 2015, in anticipation of the European Union
Victims’ Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and
protection of victims of crime, a new way of recording crimes with a
67Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.54.
68Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.54.
69Mullany and Trickett,Misogyny Hate Crime Evaluation Report (2018), p.55.
70A. Haynes et al, Out of the Shadows: Legislating for Hate Crime in Ireland – Preliminary Findings (ICCL,
2015).
71A. Haynes and J. Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (ICCL, 2017).
72Garda Inspectorate, Crime Investigation (Garda Inspectorate, 2014).
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“discriminatorymotive” was introduced through a new iteration of PULSE, referred
to as PULSE 6.8, which made changes to both the recording categories and the
recording process. As part of PULSE 6.8, the five pre-existing recording categories
(set out above) were replaced. In November 2015, An Garda Síochána began
recording 11 categories of discriminatory motives which were generated to reflect
the police service’s strands of diversity, in collaboration with the Garda Racial
and Intercultural Diversity Office: “Ageism, anti-disability, anti-Muslim, anti-Roma,
antisemitism, anti-Traveller, gender related, homophobia, racism, sectarianism,
and transphobia”.73 Thus, while there is no hate crime legislation, gardaí at least
have the potential capacity for recording gender-related hate crime. These data are
captured in the Victim Assessment screen, which also requires gardaí to indicate
where the victim requires an individual needs assessment as a result of their status
as a child, a person with a disability, a person with particular psychological needs,
a repeat victim,74 or a victim of domestic violence. It is important to note at this
point that the introduction of these new categories was not accompanied by any
training, nor any policies to support their implementation.75
The number of crimes recorded as having a discriminatory motive increased
dramatically following the introduction of this technical innovation: from 114 in
2014 to 308 in 201676:
38Ageism
12Anti-Disability
13Anti-Muslim
*60Anti-Roma
*Antisemitism
25Anti-Traveller
31Gender related
28Homophobia
152Racism
*Sectarianism
*Transphobia
308Total
Thus, the data suggest that there were 31 crimes recorded with a gender-related
discriminatory motive in 2016. Unfortunately, we cannot make any claims as to
what this means with respect to crimes recorded which were committed against
victims because of their gender given the absence of a working definition of gender
or transphobia, or indeed any Garda policy on the categories for the purposes of
recording.
73Haynes and Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (2017).
74The Garda on the scene checks PULSE to ascertain whether the victim is a repeat victim.
75Haynes and Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (2017).
76While the number of crimes recorded with a discriminatory motive increased in 2017 to 323, disaggregated data
is not available post-2016. See, An Garda Síochána, Annual Report 2017 (An Garda Síochána, 2018) available at
https://www.garda.ie/en/about-us/our-departments/office-of-corporate-communications/news-media/2017-garda
-annual-report.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2019].
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In seeking to explore Garda practices and understandings of the new recording
categories, Haynes and Schweppe probed Garda understandings of the
“gender-related” recording category.77They noted that in the absence of institutional
definitions, “both police officers and call-takers had to rely on common sense
understandings and individualised interpretations of the constructs referenced”.78
When officers were asked what their understanding of “gender related” was, they
gave very difference responses:
“I don’t know whether it comes down to transsexual?” (Garda)
“I presume it’s LGBT?” (Garda)
“… if you have a female present and there is abuse hurled at her.” (Garda)
“A crime against someone because a suspected offender doesn’t like a female
or a male.” (Garda)79
Thus, the 31 crimes committedwith a “gender-related”motive are not necessarily
misogynistic hate crimes. Nor are they necessarily an amalgam of misogynistic
and transphobic crimes (transphobia is also named separately)—some officers
presumed “gender-related” included not just transphobic, but also homophobic
motivations.
Considering policing models
In their submission to the Bracadale Review, Barker and Jurasz suggest that whilst
police recording of misogynistic incidents is a significant step forward, it
unfortunately results “only in the recording of offences locally”.80 They argue:
“The labelling and ‘flagging’ of such incidents bears no correlation to the
prosecution of crimes on a similar basis and indeed, this is impossible under
hate crime laws in England and Wales, and Scotland, because gender is not
a protected characteristic. As such, whilst police forces may be willing to
record potential crimes as gender-based hate crimes, this is something which
is legally unfounded and has no bearing on the judicial system, as the recording
has no impact upon prosecution rates, nor the pursuit of prosecutions.”81
Thus, while legislation itself may be silent on the issue, police services can in
practice extend at least the operational definitions of hate crime to include otherwise
unprotected characteristics. Instinctively, this approach seems progressive: it allows
police forces to adapt definitions and allocate resources in response to local or
regional manifestations of hostility. It also allows hate crime to be recognised
across a broader range of characteristics than legislation prescribes, thus being
more responsive to victim needs, acknowledging their experiences as victims of
77Haynes and Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (2017).
78Haynes and Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (2017).
79Haynes and Schweppe, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Ireland (2017).
80K. Barker and O. Jurasz, “Submission of Evidence to Scottish Government Independent Review of Hate Crime
Legislation (Bracadale Review)” November 2017 available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/52612/ [Accessed 21 November
2019].
81Barker and Jurasz, “Submission of Evidence to Scottish Government Independent Review of Hate Crime
Legislation (Bracadale Review)” November 2017 available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/52612/ [Accessed 21 November
2019], pp.19–20.
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hate crime. However, the potential disadvantages of police forces developing
categories in the absence of legislative policy are highlighted by Mason et al who
argue that it will either result in an overly narrow and prescriptive definition which
will exclude “‘messy’ cases that do not fit a legal category even though they may
cause public outrage”, or an over-inclusive range of categories, which “give
precedence to victim perceptions and can exaggerate the nature and extent of the
problem as well as [creating] unrealistic expectations”.82 Further, as the case moves
through the criminal process, the offence cannot be prosecuted as a hate crime, no
higher penalty is mandated on conviction, and the hate element will not be recorded
on the criminal record of the offender.
We believe that both the Irish and the Nottingham experiences offer insights
into a number of issues. First, in the absence of clear policies and supporting
training for police officers, it is unlikely that gender-related hate crime, whether
transphobic or misogynistic, will be properly recorded.83 In Nottinghamshire, the
trainingwas perceived to be ineffective, and the complete absence of any supporting
policies or training in an Irish context led to members of the Irish police service
having mixed understandings of the phenomena. We believe that training must
incorporate clear policies which include definitions of the term, as well as policies
on recording hate crime; that officers are trained on the policy; and that as part of
their training, officers are sensitised to this manifestation of hate crime so they
understand both its contexts and consequences. Second, a public awareness
campaign must accompany the introduction of new policies, to support victims in
accessing their rights. Whilst in Nottinghamshire there was a public campaign,
many of the women who engaged in the Mullany and Trickett research were
unaware of the existence of the policy. In Ireland, An Garda Síochána did not
publicly announce the change in the recording process, leaving it to civil society
organisations to disseminate information regarding the policy to the communities
they represent.84 Victims must be informed of new policing policies and practices
in order to access their rights in this context.
Having considered the models in practice, we will now return to asking how
such legislation can, or should, be framed.
Legislating against transphobic hate crime
Grattet and Jenness observe that there have been two “tiers” of categories of hate
crime in the US. The first (or core) tier, they note, in 1988 “represented a legal
response to themost visible, recognizable, and stereotypical kinds of discriminatory
behaviour”, including crimes against individuals on the basis of their race, religion,
colour and national origin.85The so-called “second tier” of hate categories, emerging
in the late 1990s, included sexual orientation, gender and disabilities. Utilising
Grattet and Jenness’ model, the inclusion of gender identity and gender expression
82G. Mason, J. McCulloch and J. Maree Maher, “Policing hate crime: markers for negotiating common ground in
policy implementation” (2016) 26(6) Policing and Society 680, 687.
83 Schweppe, Haynes and Walters, Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Comparative Report (2018).
84 See, for example, Transgender Equality Network Ireland, Gardaí Now Record Transphobia as a Motive in
PULSE System, TENI (25 November 2015), http://www.teni.ie/news-post.aspx?contentid=1461 [Accessed 21
November 2019].
85R. Grattet and V. Jenness, “Examining the Boundaries of Hate Crime Law: Disabilities and the ‘Dilemma of
Difference’” in B. Perry (ed.), Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge, 2003).
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is arguably part of a third wave of hate crime legislation, though curiously, across
the UK, trans identities have been included in hate crime statute or policy in the
absence of gender as more broadly understood. Thus, in the UK, it could be said
that the second tier of categories included (some) trans identities, with gender
understood in a broader context to be part of the third tier.
While we generally use the term “trans community” to include transgender,
non-binary and gender fluid people, legislative definitions differ across jurisdictions,
and the inclusion of the intersex community within the definition of the umbrella
transgender term is seen by members of that community to be problematic.86 In
England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, trans people are protected
either explicitly in legislation (as occurs in England and Wales though only in the
context of sentence enhancements as opposed to aggravated offences, and Scotland),
or through policing policies (as in Northern Ireland). However, the terminology
utilised in the legislation is, we argue, problematic, and often exclusionary.
For example, in Scotland, the term “transgender identity” is defined in s.2 of
the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009 as:
“(a) transvestism, transsexualism, intersexuality or having, by virtue of
the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (c.7), changed gender, or
b) any other gender identity that is not standard male or female gender
identity.”
England and Wales utilises a dated, medicalised, and equally problematic
definition of transgender in s.146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where it defines
the term as including:
“references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or
having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment.”
To our minds, it is without question that these definitions require immediate
amendment. The above definitions limit protection to those who choose to employ
medical or surgical gender confirmation. Not all gender diverse people want or
need to achieve conformity with society’s gender norms. To restrict redress for
hostility towards difference on the basis of gender only to those who express the
intention to conform, is arguably to use the protection of the law, and the threat
of its removal, to enforce conformity. In this context, laws intended to serve as
protection against hostility towards difference could be argued to manifest the
same prejudice from which that hostility emerges: we would argue that the phrase
“standard male or female gender identity” is an example of this.
In this context, the earlier Report of the Law Commission notes that whilst
victim support, the Senior Judiciary, and Devon and Cornwall Police supported
the retention of this definition, those representing trans and gender non-conforming
individuals recommended that it be changed for two key reasons. First, they noted
that the term excluded individuals who do not conform to so-called “standard
gender identities”, and, as argued by Diverse Cymru, did not include
86 See, for example, Transgender Equality Network Ireland, Trans Terms (Transgender Equality Network Ireland,
2019), available at https://us2.campaign-archive.com/?u=20394040945a32c736eefb556&id=c16b32f75a [Accessed
21 November 2019]; Intersex Society of North America,What’s the difference between being transgender or
transsexual and having an intersex condition (ISNA, 2019), available at http://www.isna.org/faq/transgender [Accessed
21 November 2019].
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“cross-dressers, transvestites, genderqueer, third gender, and androgynous people”.87
The second reason highlighted was that the use of the medicalised term is
inappropriate. In discussing these submissions, the Law Commission ultimately
concluded in its 2014 report that the definition in s.146 should be retained and
utilised for the aggravated offences provisions for three key reasons:
1) There should be no inconsistency between s.146 and the aggravated
offences provisions;
2) Section 146 of the Act is non-exhaustive, and the courts may interpret
it to apply to those who are not trans but are gender non-conforming;
3) While the definition does not cover intersex people, any hostility
towards them will be addressed either because it will be framed as
transphobic, and thus covered by a s.146-type definition; or it will
be addressed through the general aggravating factor of hostility
towards a minority group.
We would make the counter-arguments that first, if the definition in s.146 is
problematic, it should be changed, rather than retained for the purposes of
consistency. Second, whilst it may be true that the term could be interpreted
non-exhaustively, it could equally not be interpreted in this manner. Third, whilst
it is possible that hostility towards intersex people could be framed in a transphobic
manner, it is also possible that it might not.
By contrast, rather than utilise restrictive and dated language, in Canada, as we
have seen, legislation was amended in 2017 to include “gender identity and gender
expression”, and in New Zealand, s.9(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act 2002 includes
“gender identity” as a protected characteristic in hate crime legislation. The District
of Columbia, Hawaii, and Nevada include gender identity and gender expression
in their legislation.88 This language is also reflected in recent EU developments,
perhaps most relevantly in Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights,
support and protection of victims of crime, also referred to as “the Victims’
Directive” which includes “gender, gender expression, gender identity, and sexual
orientation” in its Preamble as suggested protected characteristics. The Irish
Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 which gave effect to the Directive
adopts this approach, naming “gender, gender identity and gender expression” in
s.15(2)(d) amongst those personal characteristics which should be taken into
account by police officers when assessing whether a victim has special protection
needs.
We believe that any legislation which seeks to protect the rights of victims
should, at the very least, utilise terms which are accepted by the community, are
up to date in terms of discourses, and are compliant with human rights principles,
both in terms of the principle of equality but also the principle of legality. This is
particularly true for members of the trans community, who have a problematic
87LawCommission,Hate Crime: Should the Current Laws Be Extended? (TSO, 2014), LawComNo. 348, Cm.8865
p.166.
88Chalmers and Leverick, A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crime Legislation: A Report to the Hate Crime
Legislation Review (2017).
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and distrustful relationship with the police.89 For these reasons, in including trans
identities in legislation, we would argue that the terms “gender identity and gender
expression” should be included in the legislation. We now move to asking how
this can best be achieved.
Gender, gender identity and gender expression
We believe that where the terms “gender identity or gender expression” are used,
legislation presumptively includes crimes committed against cisgender individuals.
In contrast, Brown notes that in a New Zealand context, the Head of the Justice
and Electoral Committee, referring to the question as to whether “gender identity”
includes cisgender, contended:
“… that the term gender identity encompasses the category of gender. This
broader characterisation apparently covers ‘all those who are seen as belonging
to a particular group with common gender characteristics, whether they are
men, women, intersex, transgender or transsexual. This choice of the phrase
gender identity does not appear to have attracted much discussion, if any at
all, in submission on the Bill, in Parliament or at the Select Committee stage.
Even so, the majority of the Members involved appear to have assumed that
this wide interpretation of gender identity is obvious.”90
Despite this assertion, Brown argues that the term gender identity does not
include cisgender individuals, contending that the term identity somehow signifies
a matter of a “person’s choice”, on which basis she distinguishes between trans
and cisgender persons.91 However, as we have argued, gender identity is not the
exclusive domain of non-conforming people: everyone has a gender identity. Thus,
if the terms “gender identity and gender expression” are included in legislation,
in a context which did not explicitly include gender as a standalone characteristic,
cisgender individuals would be presumptively protected by that legislation.
Accepting that by being inclusive of the trans community in legislation, we are
also including cisgender individuals, we then must ask what the most appropriate
language is to use when legislating. Some legislatures, in including gender identity
and gender expression, have also explicitly included gender as a standalone
characteristic. In asking whether “gender” should be explicitly included as a
protected ground in a legislative context which includes “gender identity and
gender expression”, from a practical perspective, Brown observes that “[o]bscuring
gender from view [in legislation] puts gender-based hate crime at risk of going
unrecognised by New Zealand police, lawyers and courts”.92 Here, she seems to
erroneously exclude transphobia from the construct of gender-based hate crime.
Taking her argument at face value, we accept that the courts could interpret gender
identity, inaccurately, as applying to only those individuals who are
89C.R. Serpe and K.L. Nadal, “Perceptions of police: Experiences in the trans* community” (2017) 29(3) Journal
of Gay & Lesbian Social Services 280–299.
90C. Brown, “Legislating Against Hate Crime in New Zealand: The Need to Recognise Gender-Based Violence”
(2004) 35 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 591, 595.
91Brown, “Legislating Against Hate Crime in New Zealand: The Need to Recognise Gender-Based Violence”
(2004) 35 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 596.
92Brown, “Legislating Against Hate Crime in New Zealand: The Need to Recognise Gender-Based Violence”
(2004) 35 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 591, 596.
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non-conforming.93 However, accommodating the misperception that only gender
non-conforming people have a gender identity, by including “gender” alongside
the terms “gender identity and gender expression”, carries the risk of serving as a
legislative reinforcement of this problematic cisnormative assumption.
We are of the view that gender should be included as a protected ground. Our
reasons for arguing this position are, however, very different to those of Brown.94
Gender-related hate crime may be triggered by the offender’s rejection of the
victim’s stated gender identity, or by the offender’s appraisal of the victim’s
appearance or deportment as inappropriate to their assigned sex. Hate crimes may
also occur where existing hierarchies of gender legitimise the offender’s perception
that either ciswomen or trans victims are inferior or deficient. Perry tells us that
hate crimes are also triggered when “boundaries are threatened, when subordinate
groups seek to redefine their place”,95 in this context, where an offender perceives
that cisgender people (of either gender), or trans people, behave in ways that are
perceived as contrary to traditional gender roles or threatening to existing gender
hierarchies. The concept of gender encapsulates, not only a person’s felt relationship
to gender, but also all the stereotypes, expectations and relations of power to which
we are subject in a gendered society. Thus, gender is arguably inclusive of a wider
range of hate motivations. It is our belief that including “gender” as a protected
characteristic in hate crime legislation is the most effective means of enabling the
criminal justice system to respond comprehensively to manifestations of
transphobia, misogyny, and misandry.
Another reason to include “gender” as a protected ground in legislation is that
it ensures that legislation is consistent across the protected characteristics. We do
not name only a sub-set of the protected ground in relation to any other
characteristic. Section 28(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, for example,
defines “racial group” as a group “defined by reference to race, colour, nationality
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins”. Similarly, gender identity
and expression are dimensions of gender. There is no legal or policy reason to
adopt a different approach in the context of gender than we do to other protected
characteristics. For this reason, we also argue that while legislation should name
“gender” as a protected ground, that it should be defined—either in the
interpretation section of the legislation, or in the section itself—as being inclusive
of gender identity and gender expression.
In reaching the position for which we advocate in this article, that is naming
gender as a protected ground, and defining it as inclusive of gender identity and
gender expression, we have struggled to balance the risks we perceive in explicitly
naming gender identity and gender expression against the risks we know omitting
them entails. We advocate for the mainstreaming of trans rights, and we are
93There is just one relevant case from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division of England andWales which mentions
the term gender identity, Yarlett, though it is not helpful in answering this question. Here, the sentencing judge
considered the sexual assault in question to be of a higher culpability under the sentencing guidelines because it was
motivated by or demonstrated hostility to the victim by virtue of his gender identity or presumed gender identity. The
Court of Appeal Criminal Division did not discuss this, but simply (and correctly) noted that the offence was a
“category A culpability because the offence was motivated by hostility to the victim based on his sexual orientation.”
Yarlett [2018] EWCA Crim 1033 at [23].
94Brown, “Legislating Against Hate Crime in New Zealand: The Need to Recognise Gender-Based Violence”
(2004) 35 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review.
95B. Perry. Accounting for hate crime: Doing difference’. Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge, 2003),
p.104.
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concerned that any legislative construction that continues to treat trans identities
as somehow outside of the concept of gender—as naming the three as separate
categories might do—sets back that cause. On the other hand, we know that the
popular understanding of gender is limited to the categories of man and woman,
and that these are interpreted as cisgender identities. Only naming gender in the
legislation might be interpreted as excluding people who identify as trans or
non-binary.
Thus, we believe that our solution—which is that hate crime legislation should
name gender as a protected characteristic, and inclusively and explicitly define
gender as including gender identity and gender expression—is a solution which
addresses all these concerns, and ensures that legislation is consistent across
protected characteristics in legislation.
Conclusion
Determining which personal characteristics deserve protection under hate crime
legislation is perhaps one of the thorniest legal, policy, and philosophical questions
which face hate crime scholars and law reform bodies alike. At the outset, it is
important to note that we believe that, whatever legislative model is introduced,
the same range of protected characteristics should apply across the system, in
legislation and in police practices: there should be no hierarchy of victims in hate
crime legislation, as exists in, for example, England and Wales currently.
The question as to whether “gender” should be included as a protected
characteristic, has been interpreted as asking whether misogynistic hate crime
should be addressed under hate crime legislation.We have re-framed that question.
Asserting that both misogynistic and transphobic crime should be addressed in
hate crime laws—and indeed, there have been no sensible arguments put forward
that they should not be protected in some manner—we have considered how best
to protect people of all gender identities from bias crimes emanating from their
relationship to gender. We have clarified that, as each of us has a felt relationship
to gender, whether that relationship is normative or not, we all have a gender
identity.96 Thus, the targeting of a victim on the basis of their identity as a ciswomen,
cisman, or trans person, is addressed by the concept of gender identity. Gender
identity is a dimension or sub-category of the larger concept of gender, which is
inclusive of wider-ranging sources of bias motivations, and therefore offers the
most inclusive grounds for protection. However, popular misunderstanding of
gender as binary, the historically difficult relationship between trans people and
the criminal justice system, and global threats to the rights and protections won
by trans people, leads us to advocate for a pragmatic solution which will be
inclusive of the range of biases associated with misogyny and transphobia, while
guarding against the wilful or unconscious exclusion of trans people from
protection.
96We intend here to be inclusive of agender identity wherein a person’s sense of identity is absent of a felt gender.
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